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of data.  ABSTRACT 
We examine the lobbying behavior of state governments in the development of recently issued 
public  pension  accounting  standards  GASB  67  and  68.  Consistent  with  opportunistic 
motivations, we find that states’ opposition to the liability increasing provisions embedded in 
these standards is increasing in the severity of pension plan underfunding, state budget deficits, 
and the use of high discount rates. Further we find opposing states are subject to more stringent 
balanced budget requirements and greater political pressure from unions. By contrast, we find 
evidence that the support from financial statement users for these provisions is amplified in 
states with poorly funded plans and large budget deficits, suggesting government lobbying is 
misaligned with a public interest perspective. We also find evidence that user support varies by 
type: internal users (public employees) overwhelmingly oppose the standards, relative to external 
users (credit analysts and the broader citizenry) but the difference is moderated in states with 
constitutionally protected benefits. This finding is consistent with the expectation that pension 
accounting  reform  will  motivate  cuts  in  pension  benefits  as  opposed  to  increased  levels  of 
funding from the governments. Analyses of 2011 and 2012 state pension reforms confirm that 
states opposed to accounting reform are more likely to cut pension benefits. 
 
   1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper investigates the lobbying behavior of governmental entities in the standard 
setting process. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) suggest that in the private sector a variety of 
different  factors,  such  as  tax,  political  costs,  regulatory  concerns,  and  management 
compensation,  influence  corporate  lobbying  on  accounting  standards.  Since  then  a  series  of 
papers  has  investigated  the  motivation  behind  corporate  lobbying  (e.g.,  Schalow  1995;  Hill, 
Shelton, and Stevens 2002; Ramanna 2008) and concluded that economic self-interests motivate 
lobbying in the private sector. In contrast, in the public sector,  there are significantly fewer 
theoretical  underpinnings  for  the  factors  affecting  the  lobbying  behavior  of  governmental 
entities,  and  empirically  we  know  little  about  the  extent  to  which  governmental  entities 
participate  in  the  accounting  standard  setting  process.  This  paper  aims  to  fill  this  void  by 
examining the comment letters submitted by state governments to the Governmental Accounting 
Standards Board’s (GASB) pension reform project. Specifically, we test whether opposition to 
proposed accounting changes is a function of expected accounting statement impact and the 
associated economic consequences and political implications of such changes.  To the best of our 
knowledge, this  is  the first  paper in  the  accounting literature that examines  the lobbying of 
governmental entities in the formulation of accounting standards. 
In 2012, the GASB’s highly contentious, 6-year pension reform project culminated with 
the  issuance  of  GASB  Statements  No.  67  Financial  Reporting  for  Pension  Plans,  and  68 
Accounting and Financial Reporting for Pensions. Collectively these statements radically altered 
both the measurement and recognition requirements for defined benefit public pensions, and as   2 
such, afford three distinct advantages as a research setting to test governmental lobbying.
1 First, 
the magnitude of potential financial statement impact resultant from GASB  proposed changes 
created strong incentives for states to participate in the development of new pension accounting 
standards.  GASB 67 and 68 require recognition of a net present liability which reflects benefits 
earned as opposed to just contributions currently payable as under previous standards (GASB 25 
and 27). The standards also expand the scope of recognition requirements to include  employers 
previously exempted from any recognition due to participation in a cost-sharing plan.  Moreover, 
GASB 67 and 68 require discounting the unfunded portion of the pension liabilities at a market 
rate  as opposed to the much higher  expected  long term asset return rate  currently used to 
calculate states’ disclosed future obligations.
2 As a result, the pension liability recognized under 
GASB 67 and 68 is expected to dramatically exceed both previously recognized and previously 
disclosed obligations under GASB 25 and 27 (Henderson and Mortimer 2014; Munnell 2013).   
Second,  in  the  wake  of  the  financial  crisis  and  ensuing  recession,  heightened  public 
awareness  of  pension  underfunding  and  its  potential  ramifications  for  state  and  municipal 
solvency motivated considerable interest in pension accounting.
3  Of the 1,000 comment letters 
submitted in response to GASB proposals over 15% were from users of governments’ financial 
reports. This is advantageous for our empirical analyses, because we are able to leverage the 
comment letters of both internal and external users (including taxpayers, analysts, independent 
                                                        
1 The GASB’s pension reform project focuses on defined benefit plans, which constitute almost all the pension plans 
offered in the public sector. As of 2007 83% of workers in state and local government have access to defined benefit 
plans and nearly all workers (96%) who have access to a defined benefit plan choose to participate in it (BLS 2008).  
2 GASB 67 and 68 require discounting of projected benefits using a blended rate that reflects “ (1) a long-term 
expected rate of return on pension plan investments to the extent that the pension plan’s fiduciary net position is 
projected to be sufficient to pay benefits and pension plan assets are expected to be invested using a strategy to 
achieve that return and (2) a tax-exempt, high-quality municipal bond rate to the extent that the conditions for use of 
the long-term expected rate of return are not met.” Under GASB 25 and 27, disclosed pension obligations were 
discounting using the long-term expected rate of return. 
3 Examples of mainstream media attention in 2009 to the “crisis” in public pension funding and its link to public 
pension accounting include the Economist, the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal 
(http://www.economist.com/node/13983688), (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/business/27audit.html), 
(http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB124683573382697889).   3 
research organizations, and governmental employees) to provide a “public interest” benchmark 
against which to evaluate governmental lobbying.  This benchmark is often absent in corporate 
lobbying studies where user participation is severely limited or is confounded by the fact that 
commenting users are often themselves also financial statement preparers (Young 2006).  
Finally,  the  GASB’s  controversial  pension  reform  project  spanned  over  6  years  and 
generated  three  due  process  documents:  an  Invitation  to  Comment  (ITC)  issued  in  2009, 
Preliminary Views (PV) in 2010, and Exposure Drafts (ED) in 2011. The long duration of the 
due process affords a more complete understanding of the lobbying process, because we are able 
to examine governments’ positions over time as their underlying financial and political situations 
are evolving. This distinguishes our study from prior research, which usually only focuses on a 
single due process document (e.g., Kelly 1985; King and O'Keefe 1986; Francis 1987; Hill et al. 
2002). 
We examine state governments lobbying behavior through an analysis of comment letters 
submitted in response to the three GASB due process documents.  Consistent across these due 
process  documents,  we  identify  four  liability-increasing  proposals  that  were  focal  points  of 
debate and were ultimately adopted in some form in GASB Statements No. 67 and 68. We 
classify state’s comment letters as either opposing, neutral or supporting on each proposal and 
aggregate these positions to arrive at a single measure of government opposition to proposed 
changes.  While  collectively  the  four  proposals  are  expected  to  significantly  increase  the 
recognized pension liabilities on state governments’ balance sheets, the magnitude of the impact 
varies across states based on their pension plan characteristics. States with larger, poorly funded 
pension plans and states assuming higher discount rates to calculate their pension liabilities are 
more  likely  to  experience  larger  increases  in  the  recognized  pension  liabilities  once  these   4 
proposals are adopted. Therefore, we hypothesize that opposition to proposed changes will be 
increasing in these conditions. 
  Likewise, we expect the real economic consequences associated with proposed changes 
to vary across states. The accounting recognition of larger pension liabilities may negatively 
impact governments’ credit ratings, cost of capital, and their ability to borrow. Moreover, the 
revelation of previously hidden liabilities may incent greater public scrutiny and demands for 
real pension reform. We expect these economic consequences are magnified in states that are 
already fiscally stressed, heavily reliant on debt financing, and facing strict balanced budget 
constraints.  Therefore,  we  hypothesize  that  states  opposition  to  GASB  proposals  will  be 
increasing in outside debt burden, fiscal deficit, and budgetary constraints.   
  Finally, we expect that state governments’ lobbying positions may also reflect varied 
political  considerations.  First,  states  with  higher corruption  levels are  more prone to  agency 
problems  between  government  officials  and  their  constituents.  Corrupt  officials  may  collect 
bribes or solicit votes  for  granting more  generous  retirement packages to  public employees. 
Since politicians have a limited horizon, it is in these officials’ interests to hide pension problems 
so that they can avoid public scrutiny when they are in office. Second, union strength may also 
affect the government’s stand on the proposed pension reform. Because of their influences on 
elections, unions are a powerful constituency. Since a higher level of pension obligations may 
lead to benefit cuts, unions are likely to oppose the proposed rules and this preference may 
reflect in state’s lobbying positions. We also investigate whether state governments’ lobbying 
preferences  are  associated  with  their  political  visibility.  Larger  states  and  states  running 
gubernatorial elections tend to attract more media attention and at a higher risk of public outcry.   5 
These states may be under more pressure to “do the right thing” and lobby in favor of reform on 
pension reporting.   
  Our sample consists of 74 comment letters of state governments and 155 letters of their 
primary financial statement users responding to at least one due process document. The financial 
statement users include state government employees, municipal bond analysts, rating agencies, 
professional research groups, and the broader public citizenry.  
  Consistent  with  our hypotheses,  we find the potential for adverse  financial statement 
effects and economic consequences is associated with states’ submissions of negative comment 
letters. States lobbying against the proposed rules tend to have worse funded pension plans and 
use more aggressive discount rate assumptions. Furthermore, these states are also more likely to 
be running deficits and facing strict balanced budget restrictions. We also find evidence that state 
lobbying reflects political pressures: smaller states and states under strong union influences are 
more likely to oppose the new rules.  
The above findings, while consistent with opportunism might alternatively reflect public 
interest motivations if users perceive the new standards as either too costly to implement or 
inconsistent with their perceptions of the underlying economic reality of state pensions.  We vet 
this possibility by examining financial statement users’ comment letter positions. Opposite to the 
results on state lobbying, we find user support for the GASB’s proposals is increasing in the 
magnitude of pension underfunding and state budget deficits. These results suggest  that user 
demand for improved financial reporting varies inversely with state incentives to obscure poorly 
funded  pensions  and  that  state  opposition  to  proposed  changes  is  misaligned  with  a  public 
interest perspective.  We also document systematic variation across user types: internal users 
(public  employees)  overwhelmingly  oppose  liability  increasing  proposals  relative  to  external   6 
users (credit analysts, rating agencies, and the general citizenry). This difference is attenuated in 
states  with  constitutionally  protected  pension  benefits,  consistent  with  the  interpretation  that 
pension accounting reform is likely to trigger benefit cuts as opposed to increased funding from 
the governments.  
We conclude our paper by exploring the relationship between state lobbying positions 
and the ensuing pension reforms. Drawing on our analysis of user preferences we distinguish 
between pension reforms which negatively impact employees (cut benefits, reduce eligibility, 
increase employee contributions) and those which effectively tax the broader citizenry (increase 
state funding).  From 2011 to 2012 we find evidence that while the unconditional occurrences of 
these  two  types  of  reforms  are  roughly  equal,  state  opposition  to  the  GASB’s  accounting 
proposals has a marginal impact of 37% on the likelihood that a state will cut pension benefits as 
opposed to increase funding.  We also find that the choice to cut benefits is moderated by union 
strength; conditional on reform, the marginal impact of a one standard deviation increase in 
public sector unionization decreases the likelihood of benefit cuts by 22%.   
  Our paper makes several contributions to extant literature. First, we are unaware of any 
other papers that provide evidence on government lobbying in the accounting standard setting 
process; others in the literature have focused exclusively on corporate lobbying (e.g., Schalow 
1995; Hill et al. 2002; Ramanna 2008).  Second, our setting allows us to contrast the views of 
financial  statement  preparers  with  the  views  of  financial  statement  users  to  evaluate  the 
perceived  impact  of  a  new  proposed  accounting  change.  Limited  by  the  scarcity  of  user 
participation in standard setting, other papers have largely concentrated on preparers’ perspective 
(e.g., Kelly 1985;  Francis  1987;  Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan 1996).
4 Third, evidence on the 
                                                        
4 A small number of papers in the private sector have also studied the standard setting process from audit firms’ 
perspective. For example, Puro (1984) and Allen, Ramanna and Roychowdhury (2013).    7 
relationship  between  state  lobbying  positions  and  subsequent  pension  reforms  adds  to  the 
literature  linking  accounting  choice  and  economic  behavior  (Fields,  Lys  and  Vincent  2001).  
Finally, our paper is current in that we study a rule change that will dramatically reshape the 
reporting of public pensions, one of the largest liabilities our governments bear, and a source of 
considerable scrutiny in recent years due to severe underfunding.   
  The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  provides  background 
information  about  the  GASB’s  reform  on  public  pension  reporting.  Section  3  develops 
hypotheses pertaining to state government and user lobbying. Section 4 discusses research design 
and Section 5 reports the results. Section 6 presents the analysis of subsequent state pension 
reform initiatives and Section 7 concludes.   
2. BACKGROUND 
Pension obligations constitute the single largest debt owed by states governments. As of 
2005, total reported state pension obligations totaled $2.5 trillion compared to $798 billion in 
non-pension debt (Novy-Marx and Rauh 2008). Pension obligations are offset by pension assets, 
however historical underfunding coupled with depressed asset portfolio values resultant from the 
Financial Crisis and subsequent recession has created a severe crisis in pension funding. As of 
2013, conservative estimates showed funding deficits of $915 billion (Pew 2014) with many 
believing the true number to be in excess of $4 trillion.
5  
Disagreement  and  opacity  surrounding  the  true  magnitudes  of  government  pension 
liabilities has largely been anchored in a debate between two distinctly dif ferent approaches for 
the measurement and reporting of pension costs: an actuarial funding based approach and a 
                                                        
5 Novy-Marx & Rauh (2011) estimate a $3.1 trillion gap in state and local pension funding as of 2009. Rauh (2011) 
updates the figure to $4.4 trillion as of 2011.    8 
financial economics based approach.  Under GASB Statements No. 25 Financial Reporting for 
Defined Benefit Pension Plans and Note Disclosures for Defined Contribution Plans and 27 
Accounting for Pensions by State and Local Governmental Employers the accounting for public 
pension plans largely preserved a “funding” perspective, under which recognized liability and 
expenses were directly linked to a states’ annual required contributions while the much larger 
unfunded actuarial accrued liability (UAAL) was relegated to footnote disclosure and utilized 
long-term expected asset return rates to discount projected benefits. In its official Report on the 
Municipal Securities Market, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) alleged that under 
this approach “trillions of dollars in liabilities—reflecting amounts promised to state and local 
government workers—are not appropriately reflected on government books, thereby seriously 
misleading  investors  about  the  riskiness  of  their  investments  in  municipal  securities”  (SEC 
2012). On the other hand, proponents of existing accounting rules contended that a funding focus 
“promotes  decision  usefulness”,  and  “best  ensure[s]  alignment  between  projected  and  actual 
funding of pension liabilities” consistent with the objectives of “interperiod equity” and “the 
perpetual nature of governments” (NASRA 2009; NASACT 2009). 
Acknowledging  this  contentious  debate,  the  GASB  added  a  project  on  pension 
accounting to  its  research agenda in  2006, issued an  Invitation to  Comment  (ITC) in  2009, 
Preliminary Views (PV) in 2010, companion Exposure Drafts (ED) in 2011 and finally, final 
Statements No. 67 Financial Reporting for Pension Plans, an amendment of GASB Statement 
No.  25  and  68  Accounting  and  Financial  Reporting  for  Pensions,  an  amendment  of  GASB 
Statement No. 27 in 2012. Representing a dramatic shift from the status-quo funding-oriented 
approach  of  GASB  25  and  27,  GASB  67  and  68  contain  4  central  provisions  expected  to 
dramatically increase the magnitude of pension liabilities recognized by state governments.    9 
1.  Governmental  employers  must  recognize  a  liability  for  the  unfunded  portion  of  their 
pension obligations (Net Pension Liability) on their balance sheets.
6  
Measured as the difference between the overall pension obligation and the fair value of 
assets  accumulated  in  the  plan,  GASB  asserted  that  Net  Pension  Liability  (NPL)  meets  the 
definition of a liability under Concept Statement No. 4 and as such, must be recognized on the 
face of employers’ financial statements. The underlying justification is that pension benefits are a 
form of compensation, which governments provide in return for work; accordingly they must be 
recognized  in  the  period  earned.  This  concept  is  in  stark  contrast  to  the  funding  oriented 
approach in the old regime where the accrued net pension obligation (NPO) recognized only 
those liabilities which were currently due and payable in accordance with the terms of the plan.
7 
By  recognizing  an  obligation  for  benefits  earned,  not  just  benefits  due,  NPL  places  a  
substantially larger liability on employers’ balance sheets than did NPO. 
2.  Employers participating in cost-sharing plans must recognize a proportionate share of the 
net pension liability.
8 
A  cost-sharing  multiple  employer  plan  pools  assets  across  participating  governments 
resulting in shared risk and shared obligation for funding shortfalls.
9 Accordingly, assets of a 
cost-sharing plan can be used to pay any employee ’s benefits, regardless of what participating 
government  they  work  for.  Traditionally,  this  shared-obligation  arrangement  exempted 
                                                        
6 In governmental accounting a balance sheet is called a “Statement of Net Assets.” 
7 Under GASB 25 and 27, NPO is equal to the cumulative difference between annual required contributions and the 
employers’ actual contributions to its plan.  
8 Proportional  allocation is according to the contribution rates of each participating employer. (See GASB 68 
paragraphs 48-50).  
9 Public pension plans can be either single-employer or multiple-employer. Single employer plans involve only one 
government, whereas multiple employer plans include more than one government. Multiple employer plans generate 
economies  of  scale  by  pooling  inv estments  together  and  sharing  administrative  costs  among  participating 
governments. A multiple employer plan can either be agent multiple employer or cost sharing multiple employer. 
An agent multiple-employer plan is very similar to a single employer plan in that it maintains a separate account for 
each participating government to ensure that the assets accumulated within the account are used to provide benefit 
payments only for the employees of that government.  This is very different from a cost-sharing multiple employer 
plan where no separate accounts are maintained.    10 
employers  from  financial  statement  disclosure  of  actuarial  information  on  their  pension 
obligations.  Instead,  fund-level  only  information  could  be  obtained  from  the  pension  plan’s 
financial statements. Critics argued, and the GASB concurred, that this presentation obscured the 
underlying obligations of these employers and precluded meaningful comparisons between cost-
sharing and non-cost sharing governments (IFTA 2010; Moody’s 2012).  
3.  Unfunded pension liability should be discounted using a market-based rate of return as 
opposed to the expected long-term rate of return on plan assets.  
Determining the appropriate discount rate for the promised pension payments was one of 
the  most  controversial  issues  in  the  GASB’s  pension  project.  Historically,  total  pension 
obligations were discounted using the expected long-term rate of return on the investments of the 
plan assets, regardless of funding levels. Proponents of this approach argued the expected rate of 
return “best reflects the employers projected sacrifice of resources” and the “going-concern” 
nature  of  governmental  entities  (GASB  2011).  However,  critics  contended  that  since  the 
expected rate of return on assets does not reflect the risk of the promised payments, using this 
rate as the discount rate downwardly biases the measurement of public pension liabilities (e.g., 
Novy-Marx and Rauh 2009, 2011) and incentivizes governments to invest in high-risk assets 
(Lucas and Zeldes 2009).  
Responding to its critics, the GASB initially proposed to adopt a market based discount 
rate, proposing for discussion in its ITC several options, including a risk-free treasury rate, the 
employer’s borrowing rate, and high quality municipal bond yields. Significant opposition to 
such a stark change ensued, and during the PV and ED stages, the Board softened its position, 
proposing and ultimately adopting a “blended rate” that incorporates both the expected rate of 
return on assets and the high quality municipal bond rate. The rationale is that if the plan assets 
are sufficient to make pension payments in the long term, using long term expected rate of return   11 
on assets as a discount rate reflects the underlying asset-coverage of plan liabilities. Where assets 
are  projected  to  be  insufficient,  however,  benefits  are  discounted  using  the  high  quality 
municipal bond rate, which more accurately reflects the risk of these un-covered benefits.  
The "blended rate" solution has been heavily criticized by economists and regulators as 
leaving room for employers to "hide the true extent of underfunding" and failing to eliminate 
incentives to "burn cash" and "chase yield" (SEC 2014). Notwithstanding, given that a market 
based rate is typically smaller than the expected rate of return assumed by the governments, 
using a blended rate to discount the promised benefits was generally acknowledged by critics as 
a step in the right direction that would increase recognized pension liability, particularly for the 
worst funded plans.
10  
4.  Ad hoc cost of living adjustments (COLAs) should be included in the computation of 
total pension liability.  
Ad hoc COLAs are upwards adjustments in pension benefit terms not specifically written 
into the pension provisions. Despite the fact that many states grant ad-hoc COLA’s on a fairly 
regular  basis,  because  they  are  at  the  government’s  discretion,  historically  they  have  been 
excluded from benefit projections.
11 Ultimately adopted, the GASB’s proposal to include ad-hoc 
COLAs in the calculation of projected benefits will increase the total pension liability. 
3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
                                                        
10 For example, during 2005-2010, the average expected rate of return assumed by the state governments is about 
8%, while average Treasury yield is about 4.8%. Applying the GASB’s “blended rate” methodology, the average 
funded ratios for municipal plans are expected to drop from 73% to 60%. (Munnell et al. 2013). 
11 The GASB’s proposals also identify other items (automatic COLAs, future salary increases, and future service 
credits) to be included in total pension liability. However, these other proposals were less contentious as they were 
already components of disclosed UAAL; we focus on ad hoc COLAs because they were unique to the proposed new 
measurement of NPL.   12 
Sutton  (1984)  uses  Downs’  (1957)  voting  model  and  identifies  the  conditions  under 
which rational lobbying will occur. He suggests constituents engage in lobbying when both the 
probability  of  regulatory  influence  and  the  expected  gains  from  influence  are  sufficient  to 
outweigh the costs of lobbying. Within the private sector, prior research postulates that while the 
costs are largely born by the firm (i.e. shareholders), it is management who instigates lobbying 
and therefore gains from lobbying may not always be value-maximizing. Specifically, research 
in  standard  setting  has  investigated  predictions  that  lobbying  may  reflect  both  shareholder-
congruent  incentives  to  increase  cash  flow  and  conflicting  agency  incentives  to  maximize 
manager’s personal wealth, often by obscuring or manipulating accounting information (e.g., 
Deakin 1989; Dechow et al. 1996).  
Lobbying by governments on accounting regulation to the best of our knowledge has not 
been specifically examined either empirically or theoretically in prior literature; however, we 
propose  that  agency  conflicts  are  analogously  relevant  to  this  context.  Similar  to  a  firms’ 
obligations  to  its  shareholders,  state  governments  have  fiduciary  responsibilities  to  their 
constituencies  (including  employees,  general  tax-base,  and  creditors)  to  lobby  in  favor  of 
accounting  alternatives  which  will  increase  transparency,  facilitate  operationally  efficient 
allocation of resources, and enable objective evaluation of elected officials performance. The 
dismal state of public pension funding at current provides compelling motivation for increased 
transparency and accounting reform. On the other hand, lobbying may also be impacted by the 
self-serving incentives of officials to obscure poor performance and fiscal distress. The economic 
and political ramifications of reported higher pension liabilities are likely to weigh heavily on 
voters perception of public officials. Elected officials, concerned with public approval ratings or 
seeking  re-election,  may  accordingly  have  incentives  to  obscure  the  underlying  distress  in   13 
pension systems.  Likewise, political pressure from unions, who may have interests in obscuring 
the  true  costs  of  pensions  in  order  to  deter  cuts  in  benefits  or  to  negotiate  more  generous 
packages,  may  influence  elected  officials’  preferences  for  reform.  Thus,  state  government 
lobbying  is  likely  to  reflect  both  the  public  interest  concerns  of  its  citizenry  and  the  self-
interested incentives of those officials elected to represent them. 
We  investigate  government  lobbying  behavior  by  evaluating  state  governments’ 
opposition to liability increasing provisions in GASB 67 and 68 proposals. In particular we test 
the influence of three potential drivers of government lobbying: expected financial statement 
impact, economic consequences, and political costs.  
H1. Financial statement impact: 
The magnitude of balance sheet impact resultant from the GASB’s proposed accounting 
changes varies by state according to their pension plans’ characteristics. Larger, more severely 
underfunded plans as well as plans assuming higher rates of return on plan assets are expected to 
experience larger increases in reportable net pension liabilities (Mortimer and Henderson 2014). 
On  average  in  2010  states  reported  total  pension  obligations  of  $57  billion,  were  27% 
underfunded to meet such obligations, and employed an assumed rate of return (discount rate) 
exceeding  comparable  market  rates  by  3-4%  (Standard  &  Poor’s  2012).  Mortimer  and 
Henderson  (2014)  estimate  that  implementing  GASB  68  in  2010  would  have  on  average 
increased states’ reported net pension liabilities by $9.2 billion with a widely dispersed range 
from $230 million for the Wisconsin Retirement System to $79 billion for the California Public 
Employees Retirement System.
12  
                                                        
12 Mortimer and Henderson (2014) compare their projected estimates of GASB 68 net pension liability (NPL) to 
unfunded  actuarially  accrued  liability  (UAAL),  a  figure  previously  only  disclosed  in  required  supplementary   14 
We conjecture that the probability of lobbying in opposition to the GASB’s proposals is 
increasing in the magnitude of expected adverse financial statement effects brought about by 
GASB 68. Accordingly Hypothesis H1 is that: Ceteris paribus, state government opposition to 
the GASB’s pension proposals is increasing in the potential enlargement of a state’s reported 
pension liability as proxied by its current total pension obligation, percentage funded ratio, and 
discount rate assumptions. 
H2. Economic consequences: 
The financial statement impact of increased pension liabilities is relevant only to the 
extent that it generates adverse economic consequences for state governments (or state officials). 
Due to the free riding problem, lobbying should be concentrated amongst those for whom the 
economic consequences of adverse financial statement impact are the greatest (Zeff 1978; Sutton 
1984).  In  our  setting,  the  balance  sheet  impact  of  increased  pension  liability  has  potential 
contracting implications for state governments who rely heavily on debt financing. By increasing 
the  magnitude  of  pension  liabilities  reflected  on  governments’  balance  sheets,  new  pension 
accounting  standards  increase  the  expected  costs  associated  with  renegotiation,  refinancing 
and/or  technical  default.  Additionally,  higher  leverage  ratios  may  induce  credit  rating 
downgrades, which diminish access to and increase cost of capital.
13 Although evidence from 
leasing  suggests  creditors  may  effectively  monitor  and  price  off-balance  sheet  obligations  
(Wilkins and Zimmer 1986; Altamuro, Johnston, Pandit, and Zhang, 2014), users contended that 
in the old regime the significant latitude in estimating the pres ent value of pension obligations 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
information. Under GASB 27, governments report a net pension obligation (NPO) on their balance sheets and NPO 
is in general significantly smaller than UAAL. Therefore the balance sheet impact from adopting the new standards 
is likely substantially larger than the estimated $9.2 billion.  
13 Moody’s 2009 rating methodology report indicates that a government’s overall debt burden and the magnitude of 
its pension obligations are important determinants of its credit ratings. Similarly, S&P (2014) suggests the agency 
incorporates government liability management, including pensions, in its rating analysis.    15 
augmented with opacity of cost-sharing plan disclosures generate barriers to assessing the true 
impact of outstanding pension liabilities on government fiscal conditions for even sophisticated 
users  (IFTA  2010;  Moody’s  2013).  Thus  we  postulate  that  state  opposition  to  the  GASB’s 
pension accounting proposals will be increasing in a state’s reliance on debt financing.  
By increasing the magnitude of reported pension liabilities, the GASB’s new pension 
proposals  are  likely  to  increase  scrutiny  around  pension  funding  deficits  and  thus  increase 
pressure on states to improve funding. Given that most states have some form of balanced budget 
requirements prohibiting deficit spending over any prolonged period of time, fiscally stressed 
states  are  constrained  in  their  ability  to  increase  pension  funding  without  raising  taxes  or 
reducing fiscal outlays elsewhere. Chaney, Copley, and Stone (2002) provide evidence that when 
fiscally  stressed,  states  with  strict  balanced  budgets  provisions  simultaneously  underfund 
pensions  and  strategically  manipulate  the  assumed  rate  of  return  on  assets  to  obscure  such 
underfunding.  GASB  proposals  would  both  reduce  the  flexibility  to  manipulate  pension 
assumptions and increase the visibility of current pension underfunding. Thus, in aggregate, we 
expect the economic impact of the GASB’s pension accounting proposals is more pronounced 
for fiscally stressed states and for states facing rigorous anti-deficit rules. 
Summarizing the above arguments, Hypothesis H2 is that: Ceteris Paribas, opposition to 
the GASB’s pension proposals is increasing in the potential for adverse economic consequences 
arising  from  the  debt  contracting  and  fiscal  budgeting  implications  of  financial  statement 
changes. 
H3. Political factors: 
Elected officials  are  also  likely to  internalize political  motivations  when lobbying on 
pension  reform.  In  particular  economic  theory  suggests  when  policy  actions  are  observable,   16 
politicians may manipulate current policy at the expense of future economic performance in 
order to increase their chances of re-election (Harrington 1993). In our setting, labor unions 
constitute a powerful constituency, intensely vested in the outcome of pension reform and likely 
to  weigh  on  an  official’s  re-election  calculus.    Pension  benefits  constitute  a  significant 
percentage of total compensation paid to public employees and are frequently the target of union 
negotiations.
14 Since pension benefits are promised future benefits, they can be granted with a 
smaller impact to a state’s current budget than direct wage increases. According to a Senate Joint 
Economic Committee report, abetted by the cash oriented budgeting approach of governments, 
“the largest de facto component of states deficit spending is unfunded pension liabilities” (2012 
pg.  2).  Naughton,  Petacchi,  and  Weber  (2014)  provide  evidence  that  when  the  “true-costs” 
associated with pension benefits are understated state officials tend to overinvest in employee 
payroll.  Given  this  link  between  pension  reporting  and  labor  spending,  we  postulate  GASB 
proposals may rationally be opposed by unions fearing cuts to pension benefits and/or loss of 
future  negotiating  leverage  as  a  result  of  the  increased  magnitude  and  transparency  of  state 
reported pension liabilities. To the extent that state officials are sensitive to union pressures this 
preference  may  manifest  in  state  opposition  to  reform.  On  the  other  hand,  underfunding  of 
pensions is an issue salient not only to employees but to a politician’s broader electorate and tax 
base.  Public  media,  tax-advocacy  groups  and  general  public  sentiment  demanding  pension 
reform may represent a countervailing political force to union opposition. Thus we expect that 
the efficacy of union pressure on state officials to lobby against GASB pension reform will vary 
according to the relative strength of public sector unions within that state. 
                                                        
14 Accordingly  to  data  from  the  U.S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  defined  benefit  pension  benefits  on  average 
constitute  7%  of  total  public  sector  employee  compensation  as  compared  to  1.5%  for  private  sector. 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ecec_09102009.pdf accessed 09/23/2014.    17 
Corruption of state officials may also influence a states' propensity to lobby against the 
GASB’s  proposals.  Higher  state  corruption  levels  are  likely  correlated  with  intentional 
mismanagement  or  neglect  of  state  pension  funds,  increasing  the  incentives  for  officials  to 
conceal  such  mismanagement  through  opaque  accounting.  It  is  also  possible  that  political 
visibility affects a state’s lobbying position. Larger states, being more visible to national media 
and regulatory scrutiny, may under more pressure to reform and be less likely to oppose the 
proposed changes. In addition, because scrutiny of public official's actions is likely accentuated 
in election years, political pressures may play a more prominent role during state election years, 
particularly when elections are highly contested. By advocating for the GASB's proposals elected 
officials  may  hope  to  project  an  image  of  public  stewardship  and  fiscal  responsibility  - 
acknowledging the need for change and affirming commitment to reform. 
Summarizing the above arguments, Hypothesis H3 is that: Ceteris Paribas, opposition to 
the GASB’s pension proposals is increasing in the potential for adverse political costs arising 
from union pressure, corruption, and political visibility. 
Determinants of user opposition to GASB proposals 
  Evidence that state opposition to the GASB proposals varies predictably according to 
expected accounting impact, economic consequences and political influences as hypothesized in 
H1 through H3 does not ipso facto provide evidence of state lobbying opportunism. In particular, 
critics  of  the  proposed  accounting  changes  argued  that  the  new  rules  require  governmental 
entities to disclose a substantial amount of information that is costly to compile. If the benefits of 
the proposed rules are not large enough to outweigh the associated compliance burden, or if the 
proposed  rules,  while  intended  to  increase  transparency,  in  reality  created  a  misleading  or 
inaccurate picture of state pension obligations, state opposition to the changes might be aligned   18 
with the public interest. To obtain a clearer picture, we empirically explore the determinants of 
user lobbying behavior  in response to the proposed accounting changes. If state lobbying is 
motived by politician self-interest rather than public interest, we would expect user support for 
the proposed changes is increasing in those same variables predicted to increase state opposition. 
That is, we hypothesize (H4) that user support is increasing in the magnitude of expected adverse 
financial  statement  impact,  economic  consequences,  and  political  ramifications  of  proposed 
accounting changes. 
4. DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1. Sample selection 
We use multiple public data sources to construct our sample. We collect the comment 
letters in response to the due process documents from the GASB. Letters in the PV and ED 
stages are available for download from the GASB’s online archive. We obtain letters in the ITC 
stage by direct request from the GASB staff. Data on state sponsored defined benefit pension 
plans are obtained from the Boston College Center for Retirement Research; missing data is 
sourced directly from the plan’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports and valuation reports. 
Our sample includes 107 state sponsored pension plans, which are further aggregated to state 
level for analysis. We classify whether a state sponsors cost sharing pension plans based on a 
2013 report published by Moody’s. Data for state financial condition variables are collected from 
Census  Bureau’s  Annual  Survey  of  Governments  and  National  Association  of  State  Budget 
Officer’s  fiscal  survey  of  states.  We  collect  public  employee  union  membership  data  from 
unionstats.gsu.edu, which compiled the data from the Current Population Survey (Hirsch and 
Macpherson 2003). We collect the number of corruption convictions of local, state, and federal   19 
officials from the U.S. Department of Justice. Election and population data are from the U.S. 
Census Bureau.  
Table 1 Panel A shows that 36 (72%) of the 50 states submitted comment letters in at 
least one stage of the GASB’s due process with total participation of 74 (49%) observations 
across  the  due  process.  These  74  observations  constitute  the  sample  for  our  tests  of  state 
lobbying position on proposed increases in recognized pension liability. Our second sample is 
the 155 comment letters from 121 distinct primary users of the state governments’ financial 
statements.  We  categorize  these  users  into  three  groups:  (1)  EMPLOYEE  includes  state 
government  employees  and  government  employee  affiliated  organizations,  (2)  ANALYST 
includes  rating  agencies  and  municipal  bond  analysts,  and  (3)  CITIZEN  includes  individual 
citizens, taxpayer advocacy groups, and other research organizations. Interestingly, we observe 
that for governments, participation is significantly higher at earlier stages of the due process 
(ITC and PV), consistent with the premise that preparers have incentives to lobby early—hoping 
to shape the proposed regulation—rather than at later stages when regulatory direction is largely 
set. By contrast, user participation is most pronounced in the final stage of project development 
(ED) consistent with the idea that salience of the issue to users has increased over time.  
Table 1 Panel B provides further breakdown of user participation revealing roughly equal 
participation by individuals and representative organizations. 72% of users have state-specific 
affiliations  and 28% are national  organizations  (primarily  national  unions, municipal analyst 
organizations, and credit rating agencies). Overall, users from 24 distinct states participated in 
some stage of the GASB due process.
15 
                                                        
15 Of the 24 distinct states represented in the user sample, 15 are overlapping with the 36 distinct states represented 
in our state-government sample. Thus, 45 distinct states are represented in the union of our government and user 
samples.   20 
4.2. Comment letter coding 
For the 74 state and 155 user comment letters in our sample, we manually coded each 
letter as expressing opposition, support or neutrality for each of the 4 central provisions in the 
GASB’s  pension  reform  proposals  expected  to  substantially  increase  the  pension  liability 
recognized by state governments. Although the specific language surrounding these provisions 
evolved with due process over time, these 4 provisions were consistently central issues in the 
GASB’s  pension  reform  project,  proposed  and  discussed  extensively  in  every  stage  of  the 
deliberation. We provide detailed wording of the GASB’s proposals related to these 4 provisions 
in each of the ITC, PV and ED stages in Appendix A along with the specifics of our coding 
rubric.  
We classify letters as opposing (coded 1) if they express direct opposition to the proposal, 
or  request  their  states  be  exempted  in  its  implementation.  We  classify  letters  as  supporting 
(coded -1) if they express support for the proposal, or call for alternatives which would further 
increase pension liability relative to the GASB’s proposal. We classify letters as neutral (coded 
0) if they explicitly express a neutral stance, or do not express an opinion on the proposal.
16 A 
combined measure of a constituent opposition (OPPOSE) is calculated as the sum of constituent 
responses across the 4 provisions. OPPOSE ranges from -4 to 4, with higher values indicating 
greater opposition to the proposed changes. 
4.3. Predicting state and user opposition to the proposed accounting changes 
                                                        
16 The GASB due process documents are accompanied by questions on key proposals to which commenters are 
explicitly invited to respond. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to assume that comment letters omitting a response 
on  a  specific  proposal  do  so  deliberately  because  they  are  neutral  toward  the  proposal  or  deem  the  proposal 
inconsequential to the point that no response is merited.   21 
  We use the following ordered logit model to predict the lobbying position of commenting 
states and users: 
Pr(OPPOSE) = ʘFinancial Statement Impact + ʓEconomic Consequences + ΩPolitical 
Factors + ΛControls + ΣYear Fixed Effects + ε  (1) 
 
where our dependent variable, OPPOSE, measures the extent to which the commenter opposes 
the 4 GASB proposals, if passed, expected to increase the reported pension liability. We include 
the following pension plan characteristics to test whether lobbying opposition is increasing in the 
potential for adverse financial statement impacts. PENSIONL measures the size of the pension 
liability and is defined  as the reported actuarial accrued pension liability  scaled by total tax 
revenues. FUND_RATIO is the funding ratio and is equal to the actuarial value of pension assets 
divided by the actuarial accrued liability. The higher the FUND_RATIO, the better the plan is 
funded. INV_ASSUMP is the reported long-term expected investment return on pension assets 
and is the discount rate used to value total pension liability under GASB 27. Together PESIONL, 
FUND_RATIO, and INV_ASSUMP provide good proxies for the relative increase in pension 
liabilities states will be required to recognize under the new standards. COST_SHARE is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the state sponsors cost sharing plans. We include this variable 
because proposal 4 is specifically related to cost sharing plans and for states not sponsoring such 
plans they are likely to have different lobbying incentives from states sponsoring these plans.  
  We  include  the  following  financial  condition  variables  to  test  whether  lobbying  is 
increasing in the severity of economic consequences likely to accrue from financial statement 
changes. DEFICIT measures the extent to which the state is running a deficit and is defined as 
per capita general fund expenditures minus per capita general fund revenues after adding back 
any midyear spending cuts or tax changes. We undo these midyear adjustments to uncover the   22 
true fiscal condition of the state.
17 DEBT measures the extent to which the state is relying on 
debt financing and is defined as per capita outstanding non-pension related long-term debt minus 
any offsets to debt (e.g., cash and security holdings in debt service fund or sinking fund).  BBR 
measures the stringency of the state’s balanced budget provisions based on the index produced 
by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR 1987). The variable ranges 
from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating more rigorous balanced budget provisions.
18 Pension 
plan characteristics and state financial variables are matched to the comment letters with a o ne 
year lag, because it usually takes a long time for state governments to compile and issue their 
financial reports after fiscal year end.
19 
  We include the following political factor variables   to test the relationship between 
political pressure and state lobbying position. USTRENGTH measures the strength of the union 
in the state government and is defined as the proportion of public sector state employees who are 
members of a labor union or of an employee association similar to a union. CORRUPT measures 
the public employee corruption level within  a state. The variable equals 1 if the per capita 
corruption convictions of local, state, and federal officials  are greater than the sample median 
and 0 otherwise. ELE is an indicator variable  equal to 1 if the year is a gubernatorial election 
                                                        
17 Failure to undo the midyear adjustments obscures the true fiscal condition of the state. For example, assume 
during  the  fiscal  year  the  governor  learns  that  due  to  revenue  shortfalls,  expenditures  are  expected  to  exceed 
revenues by $2 million. To prevent the state from running a deficit, the governor carries out a midyear spending cut 
of  $3  million,  resulting  in  a  final  surplus  of  $1  million.  Without  undoing  the  midyear  adjustment,  we  would 
incorrectly conclude that the state is doing well in the fiscal year. See more discussion on the importance of these 
adjustments in Poterba (1994). 
18 In addition to the ACIR classification of budget rules, there are other classification systems (see for example, the 
General Accounting Office 1993; National Conference of State Legislatures 2010). As Clemens and Miran (2012) 
point out, the General Accounting Office (1993) classification scheme is closely related to the ACIR (1987) index. 
Our results are qualitatively similar if we use the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) 2010 system. 
We prefer to use the ACIR  (1987) system in our  main analysis because NCSL (2010) uses a more simplified 
ditochomas system. Moreover, prior research examining the effect of balanced budget provisions on state budgeting 
also relies on the ACIR (1987) system (e.g., Poterba 1994; Clemens and Miran 2012).  
19 A research brief issued by the GASB in March 2011 suggests that  on average it takes about 7 months for state 
governments to complete their financial reports after fiscal year end.  The completion date is not the actual date the 
report is posted to a government’s website or otherwise became available. Therefore, the actual issuance delay is 
even longer (GASB 2011).    23 
year and 0 otherwise. Since a state’s lobbying incentives may be different when the election is 
competitive, we further allow the coefficient on ELE to be different for a competitive election by 
interacting ELE with COMP, where COMP equals 1 if the winning candidate’s vote is between 
49% and 51%. LnPOP measures the size of the state and is defined as the natural logarithm of 
the state population.  
When  predicting  user’s  lobbying  positions,  we  make  the  following  adjustments  to 
equation (1). First, when the user is a national organization or represents multiple states, we take 
the mean values of the state-specific variables of the states the user represents.
20 In addition, we 
control for heterogeneity in user incentives by including   two user type indicator variables, 
EMPLOYEE and ANALYST, omitting the third user type CITIZEN. We also include state fixed 
effects to control for state heterogeneity, because we find that users from certain states (e.g., 
California, Ohio) are more likely  to lobby than other states perhaps in part due to organized 
campaigns.
21 
In all our analyses, we cluster standard errors by state to correct for possible correlations 
across observations of a given state  (Petersen 2009). Appendix B lists detailed definitions of 
variables.   
5. RESULTS 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
                                                        
20 For example, the International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers (IFPTE) submitted a comment 
letter in response to the Exposure Draft. The organization represents state and local government workers in the 
following 5 states: New Jersey, California, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Illinois. We take the average of these 5 
state’s variables to construct state-specific variables.  
21 State fixed effects include separate indicator variables to capture national organizations   and organizations 
representing multiple states.    24 
  Table 2 shows opposition to the GASB’s proposals by constituent type. OPPOSE has a 
mean value of .97 for state governments, which suggests that on average state governments 
lobby against the GASB’s proposals that will increase the reported liability. However, we also 
observe wide heterogeneity in state’s position; OPPOSE ranges from -4 to 4 with a standard 
deviation of 2.01. Across the three types of users, public employees are most likely to oppose the 
new proposals, whereas credit analysts and citizens on average support the new proposals; the 
mean value of OPPOSE is 1.18 for public employees compared to -1.25 for credit analysts and -
0.73 for citizens. As with state governments however we observe a wide range of positions even 
within each user group. 
  Table 3 reports summary statistics on state government’s pension plan, financial, and 
political conditions over the sample period. On average reported pension liability is about four 
times larger than a state’s total tax revenues, only 81% funded by plan assets, and is calculated 
using a long-term asset return assumption of about 8%. COST_SHARE has a median value of 1, 
which suggests that the majority of states sponsor cost sharing plans. An average state runs a 
deficit of $39 per capita during the sample period, borrows $476 per capita of long-term debt per 
year, and is 32% unionized. About 30% of the sample years have a gubernatorial election, and 
14% of the elections are considered competitive.  
5.2. Determinants of state lobbying position on the proposed accounting changes 
  Table 4 reports the results on states’ lobbying positions. Columns [1] to [3] show that 
OPPOSE  is  decreasing  in  FUND_RATIO  and  increasing  in  INV_ASSUMP,  which  suggests 
states lobbying against the liability increasing provisions tend to have worse funded pension 
plans  and  utilize  higher  discount  rate  assumptions.  These  are  precisely  the  types  of  states 
expected to  recognize a large increase in  pension liabilities once the proposals  are adopted.   25 
Therefore,  the  result  is  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  governments’  lobbying  activities 
depend on the likely adverse financial statement effects. We also find opposing states tend to be 
running larger deficits and facing stricter balanced budget restrictions, as indicated by positive 
coefficients on DEFICIT and BBR in columns [2] and [3]. To the extent that a larger pension 
liability  is  likely  to  increase  funding  pressure,  this  result  is  consistent  with  the  economic 
consequence  hypothesis  that  fiscally  constrained  states  are  more  likely  to  oppose  liability 
increasing proposals. Finally, we find some weak evidence that opposing states tend to rely more 
heavily on debt financing; the coefficient on DEBT is weakly significant in column [2] but not in 
column [3]. 
  In  column  [3]  we  include  political  factors  and  find  a  positive  coefficient  on 
USTRENGTH, which suggests opposing states tend to be under strong union influences. This 
result is consistent with the argument that due to their large influences on elections, unions’ 
preferences on standard setting may reflect in governments’ lobbying activities. We also find 
political  visibility  affects  governments’  lobbying  positions;  large  states  as  well  as  states  in 
competitive gubernatorial elections (10% significance level, one tailed) are less likely to oppose 
the pension accounting reform.  
Overall  the  results  in  Table  4  suggest  that  the  lobbying  positions  a  state  takes  are 
associated with the effects of the proposed accounting changes on the financial statements, likely 
economic  consequences,  and  political  factors.  To  the  extent  that  the  GASB’s  proposals  are 
expected  to  improve  measurement  and  transparency  in  pension  reporting,  these  results  are 
consistent with the hypothesis that governments’ lobbying reflects opportunistic motivations to 
obscure the true magnitude of pension obligations. However, an alternative explanation is that 
GASB proposals were perceived as being fundamentally misaligned with economic reality. To   26 
the extent that proposed changes were expected to result in suboptimal accounting for pensions, 
or were associated with overly burdensome compliance costs, the results in Table 4 might be 
consistent with governments’ lobbying having been aligned with public interest. To distinguish 
between  these  alternative  explanations,  in  the  subsequent  section  we  examine  the  lobbying 
positions of primary users of governments’ financial statements.  
5.3. Determinants of user lobbying position on the proposed accounting changes 
  Table  5  presents  the  results  on  the  lobbying  positions  of  the  primary  users  of  state 
governments’  financial  statements.  We  find  a  positive  coefficient  on  FUND_RATIO  and  a 
negative coefficient on DEFICIT, which suggest that users are more likely to lobby in favor of 
the liability increasing provisions if they reside in states with poorly funded plans and worse 
financial conditions. We also find some weak evidence that users are more likely to support the 
new  provisions  if  their  states  adopt  more  aggressive  investment  return  assumptions.  The 
coefficient on INV_ASSUMP is negative across columns [1]-[3]; however, it is significant at the 
conventional level only if we do not include political factor variables. These results are opposite 
those observed from states’ lobbying positions and suggest that state lobbying incentives are 
inversely related to public interest motivations. Table 5 suggests that users view the new pension 
rules as a promising way to reform public pension accounting and that user demand for reform is 
increasing in state mismanagement of pension liabilities in the prior regime.  
We also find that the support for the provisions varies across user types. Internal users 
(government employees) overwhelmingly oppose the liability increasing provisions relative to 
external users (credit analysts and general citizens). We interpret this finding as consistent with 
the expectation that GASB’s pension reform project is likely to motivate states to cut benefits 
rather than to increase levels of funding. To provide additional evidence, we investigate whether   27 
employees’ opposition is mitigated if their pension benefits are protected by state constitutions. 
We include an indicator variable, PROTECTION, equal to one if the pension benefits of public 
employees are guaranteed by state constitutions and interact this variable with EMPLOYEE.
22 
Consistent with our expectation, column [4] shows that the coefficient on the interaction term 
between PROTECTION and EMPLOYEE is negative and significant however, the sum of the 
coefficients on EMPLOYEE and EMPLOYEE*PROTECTION is still positive and significant 
(p-value=0.066), suggesting that constitutional protection of pension benefits attenuates but does 
not eliminate employee opposition to proposed changes. 
The findings in Table 5 allow us to speak to the perceived value of the proposed pension 
reporting reform for financial statement users. To the extent that users submitting letters to the 
GASB  are  sufficiently  informed  and  sophisticated  to  evaluate  the  costs  and  benefits  of  the 
proposed rules, these findings suggest that the new GASB proposals were perceived as beneficial 
to  external  financial  statement  users,  especially  those  residing  in  states  prone  to  pension 
problems. Collectively the contrasting results of Tables 4 and 5 suggest governments’ lobbying 
activities are motivated by politician self-interests, rather than by public interest concern.  
6. STATE PENSION REFORM CHOICES 
  We conduct additional analysis examining whether states’ lobbying positions are related 
to their pension reform initiatives. Research on accounting choice suggests that managers take 
real economic actions in anticipation of adverse accounting changes.
23  The evidence in Table 4 
                                                        
22 Seven states provide constitutionally guaranteed pension benefits. These states are: Alaska, Arizona, Illinois, New 
York,  Michigan,  Hawaii  and  Louisiana.  Three  of  them  are  represented  in  our  user  sample.  Importantly, 
constitutional  protections  apply  only  to  current  employees  and  therefore  do  not  preclude  states’  from  offering 
reduced benefit packages to new employees. 
23 For example, Mittelstaedt, Nichols, and Reiger (1995) show that the financial reporting consequences associated 
with SFAS 106 Employers’ Accounting for Post-Retirement Benefits other than Pensions were related to corporate 
decisions to cut employee benefits.     28 
suggests  that  opposition  to  GASB  proposals  reflects  the  expected  economic  and  political 
ramifications  of  reporting  increased  pension  liabilities.    Accordingly,  we  hypothesize  that 
opposing  states,  anticipating  such  consequences,  are  more  likely  to  implement  real  pension 
reforms aimed at decreasing reportable pension liabilities during the lead up to implementation 
of GASB 67 and 68.   
There are two primary options for a state to reduce outstanding pension liability:  (1) 
reduce  costs  through  benefit  cuts,  reduced  eligibility  or  increased  employee  contribution 
requirements, or (2) increase funding. We test whether state lobbying positions related to the 
choice between these options by gathering data on all state pension reform initiatives effectuated 
between 2011 and 2012 as compiled by the Center for State and Local Government Excellence 
as  well  as  data  on  the  percentage  of  annual  required  contributions  (ARC)  funded  by  state 
governments  during  these  years.  We  use  2011  as  the  starting  point  for  our  analysis,  as  the 
GASB’s PV, issued late in 2010, represents the first explicit proposal of what eventually became 
GASB  67  and  68  and  therefore  is  the  point  at  which  we  expect  governments’  might  first 
reasonably anticipate and respond to incentives created by expected accounting changes.
24 We 
measure  the extent  to  which  a  reform reduces  pension   benefits  using  an  ordinal  variable 
BEN_CUT which takes a value of zero if a state does not initiate reform on benefit cuts, a value 
of 1 if a state reduces employee benefits or increases required employee contributions for new 
employees, and a value of 2 when such reforms also apply to current employees. Cutting benefits 
for current employees  in addition to new hires  will have a  more dramatic impact on reducing 
pension  liabilities  but  is  also  likely  to  be  substantially  more  controversial   and  therefore 
                                                        
24 At the ITC stage, although the same issues were debated as in the PV and ED stages, there was no explicit sense 
of the Board’s intended direction.  Rather alternatives were presented and constituents were asked to weigh in on the 
relative merits of each. (See Appendix A for examples of the questions asked in the ITC stage.)  Notwithstanding, 
results are robust to including reforms effectuated in 2010 (i.e. those occurring after the ITC stage but before the PV 
stage).   29 
politically less palatable. We also construct a binary variable INC_FUND which takes a value of 
1 if the average percentage ARC funded by a state for 2011 and 2012 is greater than it was from 
2009-2010. Finally we construct a binary variable REFORMTYPE which reflects the choice 
between benefit cuts (REFORMTYPE=1) and increase funding (REFORMTYPE=0) for those 
states who initiate one type of reform or the other, but not both. We use this variable to examine 
the trade-off between increasing funding and cutting benefits conditional on initiating a reform.
25 
Table 6 Panel A summarizes states’ pension reform choices. From 2011 to 2012, 23 states reduce 
benefits, of which 15 affect only future hires and 8 affect both future and current employees; 21 
states increase funding; 11 states do both; and 17 states do neither.      
To investigate whether state opposition to the accounting change is related to ensuing real 
reform, we classify a state as an opposing state (D_OPPOSE = 1) when the average value of 
OPPOSE for a state is greater than 0 across the GASB’s 3 due process documents.
26 We then 
regress BEN_CUT, INC_FUND, and REFORMTYPE on D_OPPOSE using an ordered logit and 
simple logit specifications as dictated by variable type. We include as controls the underlying 
economic and political constraints faced by a state. States carrying large deficits or with strict 
balanced budget restrictions are more likely constrained in their ability to increase funding levels 
and therefore we expect such states to be more likely to cut benefits. By contrast, given the 
power of unions over elections and the disparity between internal (government employee) and 
external (analyst and citizen) user preferences, we predict that benefit cuts will be less likely in 
states which are heavily unionized. Because the primary driver of reform is likely related to 
underlying  pension  distress,  we  also  control  for  the  pension  plan  characteristics  as  well  as 
                                                        
25 Inferences are similar if  we instead define  REFORMTYPE as a categorical variable which includes all four 
potential  reform  choices:  no  reform,  benefit  reduction,  funding  increases,  and  both,  and  analyze  using  a 
multinominal logit model.  
26 The results are similar if we focus on the 36 states that participated in the commenting process and run the 
analysis on OPPOSE, instead of D_OPPOSE.    30 
whether these benefits are constitutionally protected. We average all time varying variables for 
each state across 2008-2010.  
Table 6 Panel B reports regression results. Overall, we find strong evidence that state 
opposition to GASB proposals is associated with a higher probability of pension reform through 
benefit  cuts:    D_OPPOSE  is  a  significant  predictor  of  BEN_CUT  (column  [1])  but  not 
INC_FUND (column [2]).  Moreover, when we directly compare the choices between cutting 
benefits and increasing funding, we find that opposing states are more likely to cut benefits as 
opposed to increase funding (column [3]). In particular, opposition to GASB proposals has a 
marginal  impact  on  the  decision  to  cut  benefits  (as  opposed  to  increase  funding)  of  37%. 
Providing  validity  to  our  results  we  find  that  pension  reform  choices  vary  predictably  with 
economic predictors.  Fiscally constrained states and states with large outstanding debts are more 
likely to cut benefits (column [1]); states facing strict balanced budget constraints are less likely 
to increase funding (columns [2]). Consistent with internal user opposition to benefit cuts, we 
also find that the probability of benefit cuts as opposed to funding increases is decreasing in 
union strength (column [3]) and that the marginal impact of a one standard deviation increase in 
unionization diminishes the marginal probability of cutting benefits  by  22%.
27  Collectively, 
Table 6 provides support for the hypothesis that state opposition to proposed accounting reform  
is associated with  ensuing pension reform choices, incremental to the independent fiscal and 
political drivers of such reform. 
7. CONCLUSION 
                                                        
27 In the reduced sample underlying column [5], PROTECTION only takes a value of 1 for two states both of which 
have REFORMTYPE=1. Accordingly PROTECTION and these 2 observations are dropped from analysis. We note 
that  across  our  entire  sample  of  50  states  the  raw  correlations  between  PROTECTION  and  BEN_CUT  and 
PROTECTION and INC_FUND are statistically indistinguishable from zero.   31 
Using the setting of GASB’s recent reform on pension reporting, this study provides 
empirical evidence on lobbying by governments. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that  government  officials  lobby  in  their  own  self-interests,  not  in  the  interests  of  their 
constituencies.  Specifically,  we  find  state  governments’  opposition  to  the  new  reporting 
proposals is increasing in the likelihood that they will to face adverse financial statement impact 
and negative economic consequences once these proposals are adopted. We also find states with 
strong unions are more likely to lobby against the proposed accounting changes, which suggests 
governments’ lobbying positions may reflect union preferences.  In contrast to the results  on 
government lobbying, we find users residing in states with worse pension funding and budgetary 
conditions  are  more  likely  to  support  the  pension  accounting  reform.  This  finding  suggests 
government lobbying is misaligned with public interest concerns.   We further find that user 
support varies across user types; internal users (public employees) are more likely to oppose the 
reform, relative to external users (credit analysts and regular citizens). However, this difference 
is  moderated  in  states  where  public  employees'  benefits  are  constitutionally  guaranteed, 
consistent with the expectation that pension accounting reform is likely to motivate benefit cuts 
instead of increased funding from the employers.  
We  conclude  the  paper  by  investigating  whether  state  lobbying  positions  impact  the 
realization of pension reform choices. We find that opposing states are more likely to rein in 
future pension liabilities by cutting pension benefits than by increasing funding levels relative to 
their non-opposing counterparts.  We also find that unions constitute a countervailing political 
force  –  the  likelihood  of  pension  benefit  cuts  is  diminishing  in  the  percentage  of  public 
unionization.   32 
  Our paper contributes to existing literature along several dimensions. By studying the 
nature of the comment letters submitted to the GASB by state governments, we are the first to 
document  government  lobbying  behavior,  while  other  papers  in  the  literature  all  focus  on 
corporate  lobbying.  In  addition,  we  not  only  study  the  participation  of  financial  statement 
preparers in the formulation of accounting standards, but also contrast it to the participation of 
financial  statement  users  which  allows  us  to  better  distinguish  opportunistic  lobbying  from 
public interest. This responds to Gipper, Lombardi and Skinner (2013)’s recent call for more 
research on how a broader set of constituents participate in the standard setting process.  Finally 
by linking state lobbying to real pension reform choices we provide preliminary evidence on the 
link between accounting choice and economic outcomes in a public setting.     33 
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APPENDIX A: 
Four Liability Increasing Provisions and the Corresponding Wording in the GASB Due 
Process Documents 
We list the specific wording corresponding to the 4 liability increasing provisions in each 
stage of the GASB due process. In the ITC and PV stages, the Board solicits comments by 
asking questions with potential choices. This simplifies the responses and facilitates our coding. 
In the ED stage, the Board posits questions in its Exposure Draft Plain-Language Supplement. 
However, these questions are only for users of governmental financial information, and not for 
preparers of financial statements. Even users do not always provide comments following these 
questions. Therefore, the coding in the ED stage is more complicated and we ensure the accuracy 
of the coding using a dual-coder model in that each of the authors codes the ED comment letters 
independently. We meet to resolve any disagreement in our assessments.  
Below we list the corresponding questions asked in the ITC and PV stages. In the ED 
stage, rather than listing the exact paragraphs, we describe the proposals using language in the 
Exposure Draft Plain-Language Supplement. We then identify the corresponding paragraphs in 
the ED for interested reader.  
 
 1.  Governmental  employers  should  be  required  to  recognize  a  liability  for  the 
unfunded portion of their pension obligations (Net Pension Liability) on their 
balance sheets. 
ITC:  Question 2. What obligations of a sole or agent employer associated with pensions 
meet the definition of a liability in Concepts Statement 4 and why?  
  a.  A measure of the cumulative difference between (1) amount expensed, based 
on annual required contributions of the employer to the pension plan pursuant 
to  a  program  of  funding  pension  benefits  developed  within  established 
parameters and (2) the amounts the employer actually has contributed to the 
plan. 
  b.  A measure of the employers unfunded accrued benefit obligation to employees 
for the financial report date related to the employment agreement governing 
the exchange of employee services for salaries and benefits.  
  c.  Other. (Please identify the obligation that you believe best meets the liability 
definition).  
PV:  Question 2b. It is the Board’s preliminary view that the net pension liability is 
measurable  with  sufficient  reliability  to  be  recognized  in  the  employer’s  basic 
financial statements. Do you agree with this view? Why or why not? 
ED:  Do you agree or disagree with the GASB’s proposal that governments recognize 
the  net  pension  liability  in  their  financial  statements?  Why  do  you  agree  or 
disagree? (See paragraphs 14-16). 
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In the ITC stage, there 3 choices the commenter could select to express their views. We 
code a comment letter as opposed to the proposal if the commenter chose (a), as supportive to the 
proposal if the commenter chose (b). There were no comment letters in our sample selecting (c). 
 
 2.  Ad  hoc  cost  of  living  adjustments  (COLAs)  should  be  included  in  the 
computation of total pension liability. 
ITC:  Question  4.  Should  the  projection  of  pension  benefits  include  or  exclude  the 
following projected future changes? Why? 
  a.  Automatic COLAs 
  b.  Projected future ad hoc COLAs, in circumstances in which ad hoc COLAs are 
substantively  a  part  of  the  employment  agreement,  as  demonstrated  by  an 
employer’s pattern of practice. 
  c.  Projected future salary increases 
  d.  Projected future service credits 
PV:  Question  3a.  It  is  the  Board’s  preliminary  view  that  the  projection  of  pension 
benefits payments for purposes of calculating the total pension liability and the 
service cost component of pension expense should include the projected effects of 
the following when relevant to the amounts of the benefit payments: (1) automatic 
COLAs, (2) future ad hoc COLAs in circumstances in which such COLAs are not 
substantively different from automatic COLAs, (3) future salary increases, and (4) 
future service credits. Do you agree with this view? Why or why not? 
ED:  The GASB is proposing that ad hoc COLAs and other postemployment benefit 
changes would be included in benefit projections if an employer’s past practice 
and  future  expectations  of  granting  them  indicate  that  they  effectively  have 
become automatic. (See paragraph 20). 
 
  In both the ITC and PV stages, the Board seeks comments on the four potential items to 
be included in the calculation of projected benefits. However, the most controversial item is the 
ad hoc COLAs and almost all the comment letters responding to the proposal comment on ad hoc 
COLAs. Therefore, we focus on ad hoc COLAs in our coding scheme. In the ITC (PV) stage, we 
code a comment letter as supportive of the proposal if it advocates for including choice b (2).  
 
 3.  Total pension liability should be discounted using a market-based rate of return 
as opposed to the expected long-term rate of return on plan assets.  
ITC:  Question 5. What would be the basis for determining the discount rate used by 
discounting  projected  pension  benefits  to  their  present  value  for  accounting 
purposes? Why? 
  a.  The estimated long-term investment yield for the plan 
  b.  A risk-free rate (or a yield curve of risk-free rates applied to cash flows of 
different maturities)   39 
  c.  The employer’s borrowing rate 
  d.  An average return on high-quality municipal bonds 
  e.  Other 
PV:  Question  3c.  It  is  the  Board’s  preliminary  view  that  the  discount  rate  for 
accounting and financial reporting purposes should be a single rate that produces a 
present value of total projected benefit payments equivalent to that obtained by 
discounting projected benefit payments using (1) the long-term expected rate of 
return on plan investments to the extent that current and expected future plan net 
assets available for pension benefits are projected to be sufficient to make benefit 
payments and (2) a high-quality municipal bond index rate for those payments that 
are projected to be made beyond the point at which plan net assets available for 
pension benefits are projected to be fully depleted. (See Chapter 4, paragraphs 14-
23.) Do you agree with this view? Why or why not? 
ED:  As long as plan assets are projected to be sufficient to make the projected benefit 
payments, governments would discount projected benefit payments using the long-
term expected rate of return on plan assets. If there is a point at which the plan 
assets  are  projected  to  be  insufficient  to  make  the  projected  benefit  payments, 
governments  would  discount  the  projected  benefit  payments  beyond  that  point 
using  a  tax-exempt,  high-quality  30-year  municipal  bond  index  rate.  (See 
paragraphs 22-25). 
 
  In the ITC stage, all the proposed rates, except for the estimated long-term investment 
yield for the plan, are considered market-based rates. Therefore, we code the comment letter as 
opposing  the  proposal  if  the  commenter  chose  (a)  and  as  supporting  the  proposal  if  the 
commenter chose (b), (c), (d) or proposed an alternative market based discount rate (e). In the 
PV and ED stages, we code a comment letter as supporting a market determined discount rate if 
it indicates that a market based rate should be used to discount the portion of the pension liability 
not expected to be fully funded by future and current plan assets or  if it suggests a stricter 
application that a market based rate should be used to discount all the liability.
28 We code a 
comment letter as opposing a market determined discount rate if it advocates for the status quo 
practice of discounting the entire pension liability using long term expected rate of return on plan 
assets.  
 
4.  Employers participating in cost-sharing plans should recognize a proportionate 
share of the net pension liability 
ITC:  Does  the  relationship  between  a  cost-sharing  employer  and  the  cost-sharing 
multiple  employer  plan  in  which  it  participates  differ  enough  in  economic 
substance from the relationship that a sole or agent employer has with the plan in 
                                                        
28 The latter (i.e., discounting all pension liability using a market based rate) is advocated by most academics (e.g., 
Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2009, 2011) and credit rating agencies (e.g., Moody's, 2013).   40 
which it participates to support different requirements with regard to liability and 
expense recognition? Which of the following views best represents your view, and 
why? 
  a.  The relationship does differ in economic substance, and current measurement, 
recognition, and disclosure requirements appropriately account for the pension 
cost and obligation of an employer in a cost-sharing plan.  
  b.  The relationship does differ in economic substance, and current measurement 
and recognition requirements are appropriate; however, additional disclosures 
by cost-sharing employers are needed. 
  c.  The  relationship  does  not  differ  in  economic  substance;  a  cost-sharing 
employer  has  a  long-term  pension  obligation  based  on  the  employment 
exchange and should measure and recognize its obligation and expense in a 
manner similar to that for sole and agency employers.  
PV:  It is the Board’s preliminary view that each employer in a cost-sharing plan is 
implicitly  primarily  responsible  for  (and  should  recognize  as  its  net  pension 
liability) its proportionate share of the collective unfunded pension obligation, as 
well as its proportionate share of the effects of changes in the collective unfunded 
pension obligation. (See Chapter 6.) Do you agree with this view? Why or why 
not? 
ED:  A government participating in a cost-sharing plan would report a liability in its 
own financial statements that is equivalent to its long-term proportionate share of 
the collective net pension liability. (See paragraphs 44-46).  
 
In the ITC stage, we code a comment letter as opposing the proposal if the commenter 
chose option (a) or (b).  




BBR =  
The stringency of state balanced budget provisions based on the report of 
the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1987) 
COMP =  
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the gubernatorial winning candidate's vote 
is between 49% and 51% 
CORRUPT =  
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the per capita corruption convictions of 
local,  state,  and  federal  officials  is  greater  than  sample  median  and  0 
otherwise 
ANALYST =  
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the commenter is a credit rating agency or 
credit analyst and 0 otherwise 
CS =  
Indicator variable equal  to  1 if the state sponsors  cost-sharing pension 
plans and 0 otherwise  
DEBT =  
Per  capita  net  long  term  debt  outstanding,  where  net  long  term  debt 
outstanding is the amount of total long term debt outstanding less total 
offsets to debt (i.e., cash and security holdings in debt service fund or 
sinking fund) 
DEFICIT =  
Per  capita  general  fund  expenditures  minus  per  capita  general  fund 
revenues plus per capita midyear expenditure cuts and tax changes 
ELE =  
Indicator variable equal to 1 if a gubernatorial election occurs during the 
year and 0 otherwise 
FUND_RATIO =  
The actuarial value of pension assets divided by the actuarial value of 
pension liabilities 
INV_ASSUMP =   Reported expected rate of return on plan assets 
LnPOP =   Natural logathrim of state population (in millions) 
OPPOSE =  
The  extent  to  which  the  entity  opposes  the  liability  increasing  new 
accounting standards for public pension 
PENSIONL =   Reported actuarial accrued liability scaled by total tax revenues 
PROTECTION =  
Indicator  variable  equal  to  1  if  the  pension  benefits  of  current  public 
employees are protected by state constitutions and 0 otherwise 
EMPLOYEE =  
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the commenter is a public sector employee 
and 0 otherwise 
USTRENGTH =  
The proportion of public sector state employees who are members of a 
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Table 1: Comment Letter Participation  
This table provides summary information on the constituents who submitted comment letters in response to GASB’s due 
process documents. Panel A provides information on the full sample, including both financial statement preparers (state 
governments) and users (public employees, credit analysts, and citizens). Panel B provides additional information on user 
characteristics. All variables are defined in Appendix B.  
 
Panel A: Total sample 
   ITC  PV  ED  Total     Distinct~    
                       
State Governments  31  27  16  74     36    
                       
Users                      
  EMPLOYEE  13  13  40  66     49    
  ANALYST  2  2  4  8     6    
  CITIZEN  23  23  35  81     66    
  Total Users  38  38  79  155     121    
                       
~ Distinct participants across all stages of due process          
 
Panel B: User characteristics 
   EMPLOYEE  ANALYST  CITIZEN  Total    
                 
Individuals  15  0  64  79    
   vs. Representative org.  51  8  17  76    
            155    
                 
State-level user  37  1  73  111    
   vs. National org.  29  7  8  44    
            155    
                 
# Represented states  14  16  16    24~    
                 
~ Distinct participants across all stages of due process 
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Table 2: Lobbying Position by Type of Commenter 
This table present descriptive information on constituent lobbying positions (OPPOSE) by constituent type. All variables 
are defined in Appendix B. 
 
   n  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
State Governments  74  0.97  1  2.01  -4  4 
Users                   
  EMPLOYEE  66  1.18  1  1.08  -4  3 
  ANALYST  8  -1.25  -1  1.75  -1  4 
  CITIZEN  81  -0.73  -1  1.64  -3  4 
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Table 3: Descriptive Information on State Governments 
This table reports descriptive statistics on state governments that responded to the GASB’s due process documents. All 
variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 
   Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
PENSIONL  3.92  3.78  1.33 
FUND_RATIO  81.33  81.39  12.12 
INV_ASSUMP  7.87  8.00  0.31 
COST_SHARE  0.66  1.00  0.48 
DEFICIT  38.51  102.30  701.38 
DEBT  476.28  454.00  228.92 
BBR  7.82  9.00  2.76 
CORRUPT  0.47  0.00  0.50 
USTRENGTH  31.92  28.40  17.59 
LnPOP  1.31  1.52  1.09 
ELE  0.30  0.00  0.46 
COMP  0.04  0.00  0.20 
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Table 4: Determinants of Lobbying Positions by State Governments 
This table presents an analysis of the determinants of states’ lobbying positions on the GASB’s amendments to pension 
reporting proposals. All variables are defined in Appendix B. Reported in brackets are z-statistics calculated based on 
White heteroskedastic consistent standard errors and adjusted for clustering by state. ***, **, * represent 1, 5, and 10% 
level of significance, respectively.  
 
   Dependent variable = OPPOSE 
   [1]  [2]  [3] 
PENSIONL  -0.132  -0.343  -0.155 
   [-0.609]  [-1.635]  [-0.588] 
FUND_RATIO  -0.034*  -0.031**  -0.036** 
   [-1.919]  [-2.001]  [-2.258] 
INV_ASSUMP  0.474  1.710**  1.488* 
   [0.949]  [2.138]  [1.745] 
CS  0.030  0.100  -0.391 
   [0.054]  [0.154]  [-0.602] 
DEFICIT    0.0004***  0.0005** 
     [2.725]  [2.449] 
DEBT    0.002*  0.001 
     [1.803]  [0.861] 
BBR    0.282***  0.339** 
     [3.039]  [2.392] 
CORRUPT      0.399 
       [0.687] 
USTRENGTH      0.036* 
       [1.696] 
LnPOP      -0.399** 
       [-2.004] 
ELE      -0.561 
       [-0.653] 
ELE*COMP      -3.638 
       [-1.307] 
        
   YES  YES  YES 
   74  74  74 
   0.0698  0.0949  0.136 
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Table 5: Determinants of Lobbying Positions by Users 
This table presents an analysis of users’ lobbying positions on the GASB’s amendments to pension reporting proposals. 
All variables are defined in Appendix B. Reported in brackets are z-statistics calculated based on White heteroskedastic 
cluster-robust standard errors. ***, **, * represent 1, 5, and 10% level of significance, respectively.  
 
Dependent variable = OPPOSE  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4] 
PENSIONL  -0.894  -0.937  -0.364  -0.237 
  [-0.887]  [-0.984]  [-0.373]  [-0.245] 
FUND_RATIO  0.169  0.198  0.384**  0.396** 
  [1.472]  [1.519]  [2.359]  [2.394] 
INV_ASSUMP  -2.255  -3.002*  -2.171  -2.238 
  [-1.111]  [-1.775]  [-0.403]  [-0.404] 
CS  0.996  1.248  75.275  86.348 
  [0.240]  [0.259]  [0.502]  [0.631] 
DEFICIT    -0.002  -0.007**  -0.007** 
    [-1.232]  [-2.417]  [-2.019] 
DEBT    0.001  0.005  0.004 
    [0.300]  [0.829]  [0.770] 
BBR    -0.645  -2.172  -2.607 
    [-0.866]  [-0.332]  [-0.436] 
CORRUPT      7.705*  7.833* 
      [1.827]  [1.880] 
USTRENGTH      -0.370  -0.398 
      [-1.191]  [-1.359] 
LnPOP      40.129  46.788 
      [0.459]  [0.586] 
ELE      3.182  3.239 
      [1.264]  [1.245] 
ELE*COMP      5.473  5.424 
      [1.218]  [1.146] 
EMPLOYEE  3.631***  3.473***  3.602***  3.929*** 
  [4.170]  [4.106]  [4.150]  [4.227] 
ANALYST  -1.025  -1.052  -0.882  -0.728 
  [-1.529]  [-1.641]  [-1.519]  [-1.280] 
PROTECTION        -60.326 
        [-0.537] 
EMPLOYEE*PROTECTION        -2.905*** 
        [-3.082] 
State FE  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year FE  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  155  155  155  155 
Pseudo R
2  0.217  0.220  0.242  0.247   47 
Table 6: State Pension Reform Choices  
This table presents an analysis of pension reforms effectuated by state governments between 2011 and 2012. Panel A 
reports summary statistics and Panel B reports regression analysis. All variables are defined in Appendix B. Reported in 
brackets are z-statistics calculated based on White heteroskedastic consistent standard errors. ***, **, * represent 1, 5, and 
10% level of significance, respectively. 
Panel A: Summary statistics on state pension reform choices 
Reduce Employee Benefits     23 
   Affects only future employees  15    
   Affects all employees  8    
Increase Funding     21 
Both Reduce Benefits and Increase Funding  11 
No Reform     17 
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Panel B: Determinants of state pension reform choices 
Dependent Variable =  BEN_CUT  INC_FUND 
REFORMTYPE 
(Benefit Cut=1, Increase 
Funding=0) 
   [1]  [2]  [3] 
D_OPPOSE  1.454**  -0.339  3.377* 
   [1.999]  [-0.456]  [1.945] 
DEFICIT  0.002*  0.002  -0.023 
   [1.825]  [0.913]  [-1.487] 
DEBT  0.003*  -0.001  -0.000 
   [1.798]  [-0.570]  [-0.004] 
BBR  -0.204  -0.265*  -0.161 
   [-1.427]  [-1.824]  [-0.496] 
USTRENGTH  -3.667  1.367  -10.730** 
   [-1.382]  [0.598]  [-2.220] 
PROTECTION  0.505  -1.557  ^ 
   [0.563]  [-1.463]  ^ 
PENSIONL  -0.020  -0.189  1.072 
   [-0.089]  [-0.680]  [1.123] 
FUND_RATIO  0.031  -0.040  0.164** 
   [1.115]  [-1.421]  [2.140] 
INV_ASSUMP  237.236  10.882  527.234* 
   [1.581]  [0.077]  [1.729] 
CS  0.261  0.492  -6.205** 
   [0.416]  [0.588]  [-2.127] 
Intercept 1  20.942  4.614  -47.706** 
   [1.639]  [0.371]  [-2.102] 
Intercept 2  22.900*       
   [1.755]       
           
Model  Ordered Logit  Logit  Logit 
Observations  50  50  20 
Pseudo R
2  0.177  0.134  0.496 
 
^PROTECTION takes a value of 1 for only two states in this reduced sample, both of which cut benefits for future 
employees.  Accordingly, a coefficient on PROTECTION cannot be estimated. 